Binding material for a young
giant? Regional social policies in LA Manuel Riesco in Bob Deacon, Van Langenhove and Yeates
(editors). Global Governance,
Regional Integration and Social Policy. Routledge, London,
(Forthcoming) Abstract The LA integration process has already been going on for almost
half a century, showing successive advances and retrenchments. In the
background,the region’s tectonic social
transition, still in course, has been led by two succesive State
strategies: Developmentalist welfare and the Washington consensus. A new development
strategy seems to be in the making, which repositions the State as the leading
actor, although this time it may rely on the modern actors of civil society
that have come of age out of the previous periods. The new relevant questions
rather seem to be: Will the emerging strategy remain confined within the
national borders of the different countries? Alternatively, in the world of
the 21st century, will it evolve over the wider space of an increasingly
integrated LA? If so, what might be the role of regional social policy in this
construction? Emerging from a century of tectonic transformation out of its
traditional agrarian self, LA still seems to be in full transition, when
considered as a whole. According to a CELADE [2] classification of demographic
transition, about 10% of the population is still in early or moderate stages,
while 75% is in full transition. Only the remaining 15% has already achieved an
advanced level in this process (CELADE, 1998). Moreover,
when multiple other indicators are displayed alongside population data, they
seem to suggest that this classification captures much more than demographic
transition. In most cases, it may well be a quite precise indicator of the
current state of evolution of the overarching socio-economic transformation
process. Countries in the latter group, for example, show levels of per capita
productivity, and public social expenditures, which are five times, and
fourteen times higher, respectively, than those observed in the first group. In
the case of public expenditure in social security, this relation rises to over
thirty times (see tables 1-5 in appendix) (Draibe & Riesco, Chapter 1, 2007). The region
harbours two of the largest four urban centres in the world, each of them
approaching twenty million inhabitants, and several in the ten million range.
However, over 42% of the population are still peasants, according to the most
recent WB estimates (World Bank, 2004). The same day under the sun may still witness people living and working
in ways that resemble almost every social formation recorded in history. They
range from the high-qualified professionals employed by large LA private
multinationals, one of whose owners is the second richest man in the world, to
indigenous American peasants caring after their alpacas in the magnificent Andean highlands, and even aboriginals
in the deep of Amazonian rain forests. The vast majority, however, early before
sunrise, will descend by the tens of millions into packed metros, or ride for
hours clamped in noisy buses that inch through the tortured traffic of
congested streets, in their way to salaried jobs, somewhere in the huge
factories that bustling LA cities have become. They will work long straining
hours, even during Saturdays, Sundays and fiestas
de guardar[3],
mostly in small or medium sized private shops and firms, increasingly in the
service sector. Moreover, their jobs are extremely short termed, and they are constantly
forced to cross the quite porous boundaries between formal and informal
employment – no Chinese wall stands in between both categories -, with periods
of unemployment in the meantime. In Chile, for example, excellent statistics
constantly track the individual job histories of the entire workforce, being
this perhaps the only undisputed positive outcome of the renowned AFP[4] pension system. 96.5% declare themselves
salaried workers and contribute forcefully as such while they are hired.
However, only 11% contribute regularly, every month. Meanwhile, two thirds will
contribute less than one month in every two, a third less than one in five, and
one fifth less than one in ten, on the average. In the case of women, the
density of contributions is even scarcer. Only a tenuous atmosphere seems to enclose the workforce as well,
especially in the case of women. The number of them who hold AFP accounts –
each identified by name and RUT, the Chilean unique ID number, and most have
contributed in recent years -, exceeds the official INE[5] estimate of the female workforce by
almost one third, suggesting that they are also constantly moving in and out of
the workforce (INP, 2004).
Seen from the outside, or even from the inside of each country, LA seems
to present one single, easily identifiably, face. However, a careful listener
will distinguish a rich variety of tonalities in the Iberic tongues spoken by
all – which popular continent-wide TV soap operas have not been able yet to
erase. In the same way, its peoples have traversed along quite diverse
historical paths – huellas y chaquiñañes as Andean trails are called - towards
their rather astoundingly different modernities (Therborn, 1995). The fertile valleys and
highlands of the Andes, from Mexico to Peru and Bolivia, have harboured most of
the indigenous American population along the millennia, and they still predominate
there, vastly, up to this day. Their hands forged the golden magnificence of
ancient American empires, as well as the classical colonial, and latifundia,
periods. The architectural remains of all these epochs witness to the greatness
of each one (Lipschutz, 1955). It seems not at all improbable
that when these regions finally complete their ongoing, massive, fast, painful,
and sometimes chaotic, transition to contemporary times, their deep roots, rich
cultures and complex structures (Anderson, 1974), may perhaps also cradle the
distinctive richness of authentic American modernity. However, that is yet to
come, perhaps some decades into the 21-century, although some of it may be
already surfacing in modern Mexico. On the opposite side, the rich shores of Rio de la Plata witnessed the
massive immigration that flooded the area by 1900, which created the twin
cities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, one of the very few million-strong
metropolises of the world of the time. Railroads and the army expanded into the
pampas all the way south to Patagonia, in a pincer movement that virtually
exterminated the scarce and nomadic indigenous population – in a way not at all
dissimilar to what was taking place in the conquest of the North American West,
around the same time. These early developers created then the most advanced LA
social formation, which still is, although other zones are catching up quickly.
Brazil is a unique pattern by itself, out of sheer hugeness, which
encompasses one fourth of the surface, and about one third of population, GDP,
and practically everything else that may be found in LA. In addition, slavery
played a predominant role in this country, as well as in Cuba. Brazil accounted
for about 40% of total slave imports from Africa along four centuries, and both
countries held almost all those remaining in the world by the last decades of
the 19-century (Blackburn, 1997). Finally, countries that lay on the meagre fringes of the ancient
American empires, such as Costa Rica and Chile, never in the past were able to
sustain anything more than peasants and very modest lordships. The poor Spanish
settlers established there since the 16-century, even in the middle of the 20,
could well have passed for the butlers of their seigniorial counterparts in the
richer regions, as their remaining mansions and churches from the colonial and
latifundia periods may still witness. Nevertheless, they conformed tight-knit
elites that built relatively strong states, rather early. Still today, after
several mutations, these families lie in the core of the aggressive emergent
bourgeoisies that have grown up in their respective countries (Jocelyn-Holt, 1999). It is interesting to note that these transition categories, and
historical patterns, not only seem to predominate in one country or the other,
but also are seemingly present within each. This is quite evident in the larger
countries, which harbour all levels and patterns within themselves. However,
small Ecuador, for example, looks quite like three different countries whether
in the Pacific coast, the Andes, or the Amazonia, to the east, which resembles
none of the above described (Draibe & Riesco, Chapter 1, 2007). LA States led transition following two successive development strategies
along the past century. Both were violent conflicting, but seem to conform a
unity as well, in the backdrop of ongoing socio-economic transformation.
Starting around the mid 1920s, but especially after the Great Depression, many
of them explicitly assumed the twin challenge of bringing both economic and
social progress to their societies – by then quite backward, agrarian. State
developmentalism was forced to replicate what had already been created in
advanced countries by the early emergence there of the actors that LA lacked by
that time; and incubate those actors in the process. It shows quite impressive achievements in both counts, at least in the
main countries. By the end of the period, many had built basic institutions,
infrastructure, and industries, and achieved significant an sometimes
spectacular economic growth. Most important, they were remarkably active in
changing the region’s social structures, teaching millions of peasants how to
read and write, improving their health, and accompanying their massive
migration to the cities. Social policies played an essential role for this
purpose. This has frequently been overlooked (UNRISD, 2003a), and seems to
justify the usefulness of the concept of developmentalist welfare States in LA (Draibe & Riesco, Introduction, 2007; Kwon, 2005). The block in power was led by State bureaucracies – where the military
played a central role in many countries -, and supported by urban middle
classes, including nascent bourgeoisies, workers and poor, as well as peasants
in the final phase. However, there were many flavours of developmentalism. Many
started through progressive military coups, although two of them had epic
revolutionary origins. Some started decades before others. More than one
reached their climax as well under military rule, this time conservative, as in
Brazil. In others, such as Chile, democratic governments of all flavours
pursued this strategy quite relentlessly, after being primed by the military.
In the remarkable case of Mexico, the civil bureaucracy that consolidated out
of revolution and civil war presided throughout this whole period, in a lasting
alliance with entrepreneurs, peasants, and workers. Moreover, it also led the
phase that would follow. Everywhere, this block increasingly confronted traditional LA landed
elites, sometimes quite violently, especially as developmentalism reached its
climax towards the middle part of the second half of the century. In certain
countries, it climaxed in full-blown revolutions that rapidly, drastically,
massively[6]
and irreversibly wiped out old agrarian relations. It does not seem at all surprising
that – based on the progressive legacy of developmentalism - these precise
countries seemed to leap ahead of the pack, miraculously, during the period
that was to follow. By the last two decades of the century, throughout the region, States
adopted what would later be accepted as the Washington
Consensus. As a strategy, it is little more than a short list of simple
rules, emphasizing the importance of markets in the framework of openness to
globalization (Williamson, 2002). In practice, they were applied
quite unilaterally in the interest of emergent local capitalists, and
especially foreign investors, together with their reduced, high-income,
entourage. Many times, it resulted in severe dismantling of State institutions,
especially in the realm of social policy, as a frenzy of privatization and
tariff reduction took hold of LA elites. Some, benefited considerably from it, especially
foreign multinationals but local capital as well, as they grabbed many
privatized state companies for themselves, at a bargain. New, segmented,
private services, including social services, were made available to those who
could afford to pay. Everybody more or less enjoyed the flood of better quality
and lower price imported goods; except those who lost their jobs and many times
their companies when s were lowered in a rush. On the average, the affluent 10% secured for themselves over 40% of
income. They were the happy few. Meanwhile, the poorest 40% had to get along with
no more than 10% of income. The middle half got their corresponding share of
income, but about half of that went to the upper 10% within this segment that
are fairly well off. Some countries are even worse, such as Brazil, Chile, and
Colombia. Meanwhile, three constitute notable positive exceptions in this
respect: Cuba, Uruguay and Costa Rica (table 6 in appendix) (Draibe & Riesco, Chapter 1, 2007)).
Furthermore, the dismantling of public social policy affected the middle sectors
the most, as they were left largely unprotected, at the same time their jobs
got precarious and their lives more insecure in the face of globalization.
Meanwhile, a reduced public social spending was targeted in the extreme poor,
alleviating their horrible conditions a bit, or at least keeping them from
deteriorating further (UNDP, 2002).
However, the degree of unilateralism varied widely, mainly in dependence
to the kind of government that implemented these “reforms,” and the timing of
the same. A first wave was pioneered in a few countries, during the late 1970s
and 1980s, in the midst of a severe economic crisis, a decade or more before
consensus was reached in Washington[7].
Murderous military dictatorships imposed them. They seemed to plague the region
around that time, and were sponsored by local elites and the US on the grounds
of counter-revolution or counter-insurgence. In some countries young emergent entrepreneurial
classes supported Neoliberal “reforms” with a vengeance, as they were full of
hatred against the successful State-led reforms of the previous period, mostly
performed against their landowner forefathers. In countries that had no
experienced significant developmentalism, this wave of “reforms” was
reluctantly pushed by decadent and terrified landed oligarchies, sometimes in the
midst of civil wars. The second wave of “structural reforms” was implemented during the
generally expansive 1990s by the democratic governments that replaced
dictatorships almost everywhere. They were rather moderate, quite light in fact
in some countries, and took place in the backdrop of an expansion in per capita
public social spending that averaged 40% during the decade (UNDP, 2002).
Nevertheless, some degree of State dismantling, more or less severe, took place
anyway, although now under the influence of “third wave” ideologues, who made
damaging efforts to transform public institutions into service providers to
citizens they conceptualized as consumers (Suleiman, 2004). The massive and rapid social transformation that had been taking place
in LA under developmentalism, which was then so effectively both stimulated and
made more humane by its public social policy, continued in full during the
Neoliberal period. It even reached new heights, although this time in a rather ruthless
manner. Alphabetization, sanitary, and housing policies on the one hand, and
agrarian reform on the other, had been the main instruments of social change
under developmentalism. During the Neoliberal period, they were replaced by
violent culmination of agrarian reform processes that did not reposition
latifundia, but forcefully expelled hundreds of thousands of peasants into the
roads. This same effect was the result of cruel, open, and protracted, civil
wars, which resulted in massive peasant migration to the cities, and to the
North, especially in Central America and Colombia. Massive economic
displacements induced by severe economic crisis, and globalization, played not
a small part as well. As a result, peasant migration that had doubled in speed towards the mid
20-century, and tripled again during the height of developmentalism in the
1970s, maintained that frantic pace all through the 1980s, only to decline in
the 1990s (CENDA, 2007). However, in
the zones where this process has taken place later, it is still ongoing in
full, and probably even accelerating in some countries. On the other hand, Neoliberal privatization of State enterprises, social
services and pension funds, replaced tariffs and credit policies used by developmentalism
as the main ways to promote local capitalists. These policies induced the
growth of some into huge conglomerates. In some cases, they attained this
status without disbursing a penny of their own – which they did not posses in
advance, in any case -, as functionaries in charge of privatizing public
enterprises and utilities kept them for themselves (Illanes & Riesco, 2007). Why did the Washington Consensus
replace developmentalist strategies in LA? A sober, data supported, assessment,
will probably contradict the usual slogans about it. It did not seem to happen
because of stagnant growth, because the developmentalist period shows still
unparalleled record in this aspect, especially as it approached its climax. The
1980s crisis affected extreme Neoliberal Chile the most, and pragmatic or
“unorthodox” Costa Rica the least. Neither due to “big State,” because public
expenditures has always been very low in LA by international developed
standards, especially concerning social policies, and regulations have always
been rather slack. It seems difficult as well to blame “populist monetary
irresponsibility,” (Dornbusch, 1991) because although
developmentalism was generally expansive, the worst episodes of hyperinflation
in fact took place under Neoliberal ministers. Conspiracy theories blaming the
BWI seem also difficult to swallow, as the main cause of such a wide and
overarching phenomena, although evidently they promoted it in all their might. Perhaps, it was just that the success of developmentalism in modernizing
social structures that made it redundant in the end, becoming a hurdle,
especially in some of its economic aspects. State developmentalism put in place
the initial conditions, the essential although rarely mentioned premise for the
takeoff of modern markets: the previous existence of masses of fairly educated
and healthy workers, mostly urban but in any case freed from the bondages of
traditional peasantry. Maybe it created its own gravediggers. An unambiguous shift of direction away from Neoliberalism – as
formulated by The Economist assessing
Lula’s election -, has been taking place in LA since the 1997 economic crisis.
Throughout the region, wide coalitions have appeared, sometimes out of the
unexpected, which have gained access to political power in many countries, or
barely missed doing so in others. Neoliberal thinking is still strong and
dominates within academia, government cadres, and holds its own in their still
mostly impregnable citadels of Finance Ministries and Central Banks. However,
it seems clearly on the defensive, and even right wing parties no longer
campaign under its slogans. The current world crisis has reinforced this
tendency considerably. A new development strategy seems to be in the making, which repositions
the State as the leading actor, although this time it may rely on the modern
actors of civil society that have come of age out of the two previous periods.
Social policy once again moves centre stage, as the new strategy offers an
explicit Rooseveltian New Deal to the massive urban salariat that is emerging
in the region’s booming cities, and renews its commitment both with the urban
poor, and peasants who continue their migration in huge numbers, especially in
some countries. Although subject to serious criticism from the left, and certainly
controversial, the case may be argued that President Lula pioneers the new LA
development. Based on PT, a highly structured and experienced, mass
worker-based, party and movement, which has been characterized as essentially
non co-opt, Lula has managed to assemble an impressive alliance, while still
maintaining unprecedented popular support. President Kirchner and his wife
Cristina have been able to reshuffle the Peronist party once again in
Argentine. Through decisive state intervention they rescued the economy from
the catastrophic collapse of neoliberal policies in 2002 and continued to push
for a version of the emerging model. As in the case of Lula, their popular
support remains overwhelming, even though they have faced strong opposition
from the powerful Argentinean conservative forces. Even in Neoliberal Chile, President Michelle Bachelet has expressed a
desire for change, and although her government has not made significant breaks
form the prevailing model, she is partially overhauling the privatized pension[8]
and education[9] systems. A good example of how the current crisis has empowered the new
tendencies is the current re-nationalization of privatised pensions by the
Argentinean government, on ground of the massive losses of the funds. The
probable outcome is that all privatised pension systems will be re-nationalised
throughout Latin America before the crisis is over. All the above events are taking place in South American countries that
have attained advanced stages in the transition process, and in giant Brazil.
In a different scenario, paramount events are taking place in Bolivia, and
changes are taking place as well in Nicaragua and other countries that are
still in early or moderate stages of socio-economic transition, as well as in
Venezuela and Ecuador, which are still in full transition. In all these
countries, movements have surged to power, which question the Neoliberal model
in a generally radical manner. Their achievements are considerable, especially
in recovering ground rent from natural resources [10]
and improving the incomes and participation of the poor, which in turn have
voted them overwhelmingly in successive democratic elections. It must be emphasized that although both versions of the emerging
strategy coalesce under the same “change the model” slogan, the latter
processes are different in nature from the ones described above, which take
place in the relatively more advanced countries. Perhaps no better way to show
this difference than to mention that the main social actor in these countries
are peasants or recent rural immigrants, which in turn have been reduced to a
relatively small number in those described earlier. In this sense, the two versions of the emerging strategy are not
competitive but complementary. The stroke of a magician could interchange
presidents Lula and Morales, for example, only to find out that both would probably
continue roughly with the policy of the other in their respective countries.
For this reason, Brazil and Argentina, and even Chile, have consistently
supported the processes in the less developed countries. Especially, in the
face of aggressive intervention against them by the Bush administration, which
has been utterly irresponsible in promoting regional separatism in countries
whose governments it doesn’t like, which could easily create havoc throughout
the region. Europeans have also showed a marked tendency to demonise the latter
group of countries, especially those that have nationalised multinationals of
that origin. In addition, both versions fully coincide in what seems to be the main
feature of the emerging model: regional integration. A new developmentalist welfare State model seems to be in the making in
LA. Its outlined design, and the kind of social structure in background, bear
strong resemblances to what Western Europe, the US, and other developed
countries experienced around the time of 20-century Golden Age. In this sense,
the new relevant questions for LA seem to be: Will the emerging strategy remain
confined within the national borders of the different countries? Or will it
evolve over the wider space of an increasingly integrated LA? If so, what might
be the role of regional social policy in this construction? Modern nation building seems to be compelled by an underlying tendency that
pushes towards sovereign spaces of adequate dimensions. During the 19-century
these may have more or less coincided with the order of magnitude of GB, the
leader at the time. The emergence of the US during the 20-century, a new leader
with continental dimensions, and the Soviet Union on the other side, may have
prompted the forming the European Union in its original form. Strategic
planners and informed public opinion have recently been assessing the consequences
of the emergence of China and India, which potentially may in the near future
surpass the order of magnitude of the US. Certainly, this phenomenon weights in
the minds of those who have been pushing to elevate the sovereign status of the
EU and enlarge it even more. As the current crisis has once again affirmed in
the minds of policymakers, modern markets and sovereign States have developed
in inextricable unity, as the hen and the egg. Rapidly modernizing LA face challenges that seemingly exceed the dimensions
of its present republics by far, even the largest. Achieving a basic level of
autonomy and competitiveness in science and technology, energy provision, land
and information communications networks, complex industries such as aerospace
and defence, and many other areas, does not seem possible within their current
dimensions, for most countries at least.
Conforming a market of the adequate size and degree of sovereignty to
compete in the 21-century seems to be their main challenge facing LA. Strategic
planners should be giving more thought to this matter, and some seem to have
done so (Pinheiro Guimarães, 2007) The region appears a natural space over which such institutional
construction may take place. Its total area is twice China. Its inhabitants are
approaching 600 million today, will reach 700 million within two decades and
near one billion by mid century, well within the order of magnitude of the
world leaders. They will no longer be ignorant subservient peasants, as they
were in their overwhelming majority at the turn of the 19-century, or even
masses in full transition as they are at the turn of the 20-century. In two or
three decades at most the vast majority of LA population will have achieved the
status of citizens, with decent health standards, basic and secondary education
of reasonable quality, and high numbers having completed tertiary level as
well. Even today because of its more advanced urbanization, per capita GDP
adjusted by purchasing power in LA is almost twice that of China, according to
the 2007 ranking by the World Bank. The economic projection of the emergence of
these huge concentrations of market-oriented workers is paramount [11].
They seem to constitute a sound base for an economic market in the major
leagues; if in addition, LA manages to acquire some degree of sovereign power –
certainly a big “if” (CENDA, 2004).
The idea of integration is as old as LA independence, which is why it is
called Bolivar’s dream. Frustrated, stagnant, or ineffectual initiatives abound (Ffrench-Davis & Devlin, 1998). However, the
exhaustive list of successive integration initiatives duly updated by the Inter
American Development Bank (IDB) (INTAL, 2008) shows an
impressively consistent and rapidly accelerating activity in the matter (see ,
Figure 1 and Table 1 below, and Tables 6-8 in appendix). Participants Decade
started New
Schemes New
Agreements LA
Integration 1950 1 3 1960 5 20 1970 2 19 1980 1 21 1990 8 52 2000 15 118 LA
Integration Count 32 233 LA-USA 1990 2 5 2000 4 34 LA-USA
Count 6 39 LA-Others 1990 1 3 2000 18 45 LA-Others
Count 19 48 LA-EU 1990 1 2 2000 4 15 LA-EU
Count 5 17 Grand
Total 62 337 Source: (INTAL, 2008) Table 9 in
Appendix The figures show that in spite of the high profile FTA between the US
and LA it has been intra-regional trade and integration agreements that have
been in the centre of LA foreign policy all along. Extra regional schemes
appeared only in the 1990s and have been important in the 2000s. Meanwhile, LA
integration efforts have been adding up consistently along half a century and
have vastly predominated during the last two decades as well. The first integration initiative is registered in 1951 in the Carta de San Salvador (Letter of San
Salvador) that inaugurates the activity towards what is now called Mercado Común Centroamericano -Sistema de la
Integración Centroamericana (SICA) (central American Common Market – System of
Central American Integration) , scheme that is both the earliest and the
longest standing. The start of trade agreement negotiations with the EU in
October 2007 was its 44th mayor agreement along five decades of
consistent development, which includes a common market and development bank (1960s),
regional parliament (1980s), and court of justice (1990s). The Caribbean countries have built their
own integration process in CARICOM (1968), reinforced by Asociación de Estados del Caribe (Caribbean States Association) (1994).
Both schemes have been very active up to the present day. The most ambitious initiative was promoted by developmentalism in its
climax. The Treaty of Montevideo signed
on February 18, 1960 created the
Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (Latin American
Association of Free Trade), ALALC. Later ALADI, it embraced all the main
countries from Río Grande to Patagonia. It managed to function during a decade,
applied several barrier reductions, and built a secretariat, following the EU
model. ECLAC, inspired by Prebisch, and Chile led by Frei Montalva and then by
Allende, were active promoters of ALALC-ALADI, together with progressive
governments throughout the region, certainly including Mexico in the opposite
end. It is still the widest legal framework for LA integration. Cuba adhered in
1999, and when MERCOSUR signed a pact in 2004 with three CAN countries,
Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador, they asked ALADI to protocol it. In 1966, after conservative military governments had taken power in
Brazil and Argentina, progressive governments in Chile, Perú, Bolivia, Ecuador
Colombia and Venezuela started working towards the more advanced Acuerdo de Cartagena (Agreement of
Cartagena). Signed in May 26 1969, it created the Comunidad Andina de Naciones (Andean Community of Nations)(CAN) as a temporary second best. The structures of
ALALC were transplanted to CAN and still operate in this realm from large and
modern headquarters in Lima. The latter include the well-funded Corporación Andina de Fomento (1968),
and Banco Andino de Fomento (1969), and
a regional parliament (1979), among other institutions. The evolution of CAN has certainly not been problem-free. Chile withdrew
in 1976, after the Pinochet coup. Peru withdrew partially under Fujimori but
reinserted itself in 1997. Venezuela withdrew in 2006 in protest of the signing
of FTA with the US by Colombia and Peru; rightly denouncing such pacts as
contrary to LA integration. In a quite evident countermove Chile rejoined this
pact one month later. However, at the same time, the newly elected governments
of Presidents Morales and Correa, in Bolivia and Ecuador, two of the Andean
Pact’s long standing members, are signalling their adherence to the main integration
strategy, led by Mercosur, which Venezuela has already joined (INTAL, 2008). The creation of Mercosur by the treaty of Asunción, signed by Brazil,
Argentine, Uruguay, and Paraguay, in May 26, 1991, was a major milestone in the
LA integration process. Mercosur is the highest expression of integration
efforts in LA up to now. With the inclusion of Venezuela in April 2006, it now
encompasses 256 million inhabitants (2005) and a GDP of almost two trillion
dollars (ppp[12], 2002),
which represent 46% and 50% of the respective figures of the LA region as a
whole (Draibe & Riesco, Chapter 1, 2007). Not only has
Mercosur advanced consistently in the economic front, surmounting severe
economic and political crisis in its relevant partners, but also has a complex
and growing institutions. The latest addition is Parlamento del Mercosur, officially inaugurated in May 7, 2007 and
initially conformed by 18 members from each member country, selected by the
respective parliaments, which in 2010 will hold its first universal election.
The countries associated to Mercosur, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru, may send non-voting observers. Mercosur-led integration strategy is presently focused in the
convergence of all of South America in a common initiative (Pinheiro Guimarães, 2007). The Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones was
created in September 9, 2005, signed by all LA countries, and coordinating the
existing structures of both Mercosur and CAN, with the concurrence of the
remains of ALADI, as well as the sub regional initiative that unites Caribbean
nations, CARICOM. This process received an important boost during the
Presidential Meeting of Cochabamba, in September 12, 2006. The final
declaration of this meeting creates a coordinating secretariat for the Comunidad Sudamericana, and advanced in
integration projects, mainly in the area of energy[13].
Mexico and Panama have signed as observers to UNASUR, as its now called,
which certainly represents a real alternative for the other regional giant, in
the case it may opt to look more towards the south, as it did during the height
of the developmentalist period. In parallel, Venezuela is leading a sub regional effort that has more a
more ambitious timetable, the Acuerdo
para la aplicación de la alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra
América y el Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos, ALBA, and the Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos
(Agreement for the application of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peooples
of America, ALBA, and the Treaty of Commerce of the Peoples), which also
includes Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. The first three countries signed
this pact in April 29, 2006, and the last adhered in January 2007. Social policy
has not been a major component of LA integration schemes until now, in practice.
However, it has been present in the wording of all of them since their initial
conception, and has taken some significant steps, mostly related to labour
rights, education, migration, and assistance to backward regions, among many
others. CAN, for
example, has signed specific agreements on the matter, such as the “Integración
Educativa en el Acuerdo de Cartagena” (Educational integration in
the agreement of Cartagena) (1970), “Integración Sanitaria en el Acuerdo de Cartagena”
(Sanitary Integration in the Agreement of Cartagena) (1976), “Integración
Sociolaboral en el Acuerdo de Cartagena” (Socio-labour in the
Agreement of Cartagena) pact (1976), and created the Foro de debate, participación y
coordinación para temas sociolaborales” Debate, participation and
coordination Forum for socio-labour matters) (2001), and established a Plan
Integrado de Desarrollo Social (Integral plan for social
development) (2003) (INTAL, 2008). The Alianza para el Desarrollo Ostensible de
Centroamérica (Alliance for the Sustainable Development of Central
America) (ALIDES), signed in 1994 by the presidents of
Central American republics, is probably the most comprehensive agreement signed
in the region, states that “we have materialized a national and regional
strategy that is integral, considering political, moral, economic, social and
ecological aspects.” Mercosur is probably
the scheme that has advanced the most in this matter, and represents a good
example of both the advances and limitations of regional social policies in LA.
The former have been considerable in educational agreements, and include the
mutual partial recognition of titles even in the most sensitive professions
such as medicine and engineering. However, it is labour policies that show interesting
advances, especially regarding its institutional schemes, and the early
installation of tripartite commissions – government, business and labour –
which specifically have to review and approve all matters related to social
policy. The structure
of Mercosur includes regular cabinet ministers meetings, and in some cases permanent
groups, in areas such as education, health (SGT Nº11), social development,
social security and labour (SGT Nº10). In addition, there is a task force for
the creation of Instituto Social del Mercosur (Mercosur
Social institute) (GISM), and social policy is indirectly addressed in two
other high level task forces, the Grupo
Alto Nivel Estrategia Mercosur de Crecimiento del Empleo (High level group
for the strategy of Mercosur on employment increase (GANEMPLE), and Grupo de Trabajo Ad Hoc para Superación de
Asimetrías en el Mercosur (Ad-hoc workgroup for the superation of
assimetries of Mercosur) (GTASM). There is also a tripartite Foro Consultivo Economic Social (Socioeconomic
Consultation Forum) (Figure 3 in
appendix). From the very
start, Mercosur signed an educational protocol that declared its intention to:
“be a regional space that delivers and
guarantees education with equity and quality, characterized by mutual
knowledge, interculturalism, respect to diversity, solidarity cooperation, with
shared values that contribute to the improvement and democratization of
educational systems in the region and generate favourable conditions for peace,
by means of sustainable social, economic and human development.” It established
three main purposes 1) Promoting a favourable disposition to the integration process
in citizens’ consciences, 2) form human resources to contribute to development
and, 3) harmonisation of educational systems. The same protocol established the
above-mentioned regular Ministerial meeting and a permanent regional
coordination committee (CCR), as well as action plans (4 at the moment) to
promote these objectives. The present plan explicitly tries to address the
inequity and dissymmetry of the educational system in Mercosur. According to
its own assessment (MINEDUCC, 2007)), the main
achievement is the continuity of such efforts, notwithstanding “oscillations and slow steps in the framework
of severe economic and political crisis of member states and instabilities of
Mercosur.” It underlines
important advances regarding its relations with civil society and NGOs. It
mentions several significant protocols and agreements already signed, some of
which are: educational integration and mutual recognition of titles and
diplomas in basic and medium level, integration for post graduate studies and
acceptance of students in this level, mutual recognition of titles for academic
purposes. There is also a project of statistical indicators for Mercosur and
another for bordering schools, among others. The plan
2006-2010 establishes detailed targets along these lines. One program that
seems interesting to highlight is the interchange of students, teachers, and
headmasters, both in pre grad – this one with financial support of the EU - and
post grad levels. An experimental scheme of accreditation of university careers
has also been established, for Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile. It has already
listed over 50 careers, in Agronomy, Engineering and Medicine (MINEDUCC, 2007). In health,
there are several intergovernmental commissions working in areas such as AIDS,
Dengue, tobacco control, health in the workplace, and sexual health. There is a
permanent Commission on Health and Development, and four additional ad-hoc
committees/programs, in areas such as medicines, bank for medicine prices,
international sanitary norms, and vigilance on transmissible illness (figure 3
in appendix). In labour
policies, Mercosur has a general and ambitious goal: “promoting economic
growth, the widening of internal and regional markets, and implement active
policies that stimulate employment growth, to elevate the life standards and
correct social and regional” (Article 14 of Declaración Sociolaboral del MERCOSUR) (Mercosur, 2008). There is a Mercosur
labour legal framework in construction, made up of a number of international
labour conventions ratified by all Mercosur member states, the Mercosur Social
and Labour Declaration (a charter of fundamental labour rights that is
increasingly applied by courts in member states), the Mercosur Multilateral
Social Security Treaty, the repertory of practical recommendations on
vocational training, as well as some instances of regional collective
bargaining and the statements of the Mercosur Social and Labour Commission (Ermida
Uriarte, 2007).
There is also an especial meeting on women’s rights. A very
interesting new development in Mercosur is the creation in 2008 of the Universidade
Federal da Integração Latino-Americana (Federal University of Latin-American
Integration) (UNILA). Its aim is to have 10.000 students in undergraduate and
postgraduate courses, who will become specialists in Latin America and with a
“Latin-American conscience.” The new State led development strategy that seems to be in the making
probably will only make sense over the larger and increasingly integrated LA space.
However, there are plenty of obstacles to surmount, not least the above-described
wide differences in socioeconomic, historical, and institutional, evolution of
the different countries. However, the main hurdle to LA integration is the powerful attraction
from its massive neighbour to the north, which constantly pulls the individual
countries into its orbit. The imbalance of powers is huge. Just considering
their economies, LA GDP (ppp) as a whole adds up to around 40% of the US;
Brazil, the largest country, is about a third of that, meaning it is about 15%
of the US economy at present. In other aspects, the abyss in their relative
State power is even more overwhelming. It seems out of the question that the US
would ever consider surrendering even a minimal degree of sovereignty in the
benefit of building an integrated zone in more or less equal terms. Quite on
the contrary, their explicit State policy promotes the continued balkanisation
of LA and the subordination of individual countries. In 2001, President George H. Bush launched the FTAA, “an economic free
zone extending all the way from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.” However, the
evidently imbalanced approach of the US to “free trade” in favour of its own
interests has all but buried FTAA for the time being.[14] Mercosur led by Brazil did not accept
unilateral opening to trade and investment, government procurements, and TRIPS,[15]
because the US would not even consider lowering its farm subsidies, or
non-tariff barriers, among other aspects. In turn, the LA countries that have been
adhering to individual FTA, led by Mexico and Chile, have accepted these
impositions. These are more restricted version of FTAA that the US has been
pushing throughout the region as a second best, after the failure of the larger
initiative (CENDA, 2004; INTAL, 2008). The LA desk of the US foreign office is in constant vigil to take
initiatives that are more concrete. A notorious example happened when Chilean
President Ricardo Lagos embraced his close friend Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
then Brazilian President, in PlanAlto palace during his first State visit,
shortly after his election in 2000. A socialist and lifelong promoter of LA
integration, Lagos made the formal promise that Chile would become full member
of Mercosur within few months. However, his enthusiasm damped quickly when he
received a telephone call from then President Clinton, who offered a FTA for
Chile if Lagos withdrew this compromise. Which he quickly did, moreover,
without even giving a call to his friend Cardoso before rushing to make the
public announcement of FTA with the US and delayed Mercosur membership. This
has not been forgotten in PlanAlto, and especially in Itamarati, the highly professionalized Brazilian Foreign Ministry
that has been the most consistent promoter of LA integration (Pinheiro
Guimarães, 2007).
Constant activity by other dependencies of the US government that
operate more discretely, are perhaps even more effective in spraying sand in
the gears of the integration process. For example, the main newspapers
of the region are organized in Group de Diaries
América (GDA), which leans towards US policy regarding LA. The so-called
“serious” press regularly publishes headlines, news, and commentaries,
reproduced by this syndicate [16],
which highlight the multitude problems confronting LA integration, while muting
or disdaining its advances. In this way the overwhelming perception of LA
public on the matter is so far removed from the actual state of the process,
that even the enumeration of the constant activity regarding integration along
half a century, such as was presented above, would come as a deep surprise even
in learned circles. However, formidable as these obstacles may seem, it does not seem
reasonable to assert beforehand that they are insurmountable. Especially, because
they pale in comparison to the paramount complexity of uniting the myriad
peoples, languages, cultures, histories, and relative levels of development,
during the successful process of nation building in Western European during the
19h century, or those that have been surmounted along the road to EU. Powerful, motivated, and committed actors, operating under a more or
less coordinated long-term State strategy, are necessary to overcome the difficulties
confronting LA integration. This requisite is consistent with the requirement
of a new block in power that has been mentioned in reference to the emerging
development strategy. Are these actors in place today? Are they authoritative
enough? Do they have a strategy? Are they riding favourable winds and currents?
The answers to these questions do not seem overly pessimistic concerning the
chances of the process. Moreover, regional social policy could become a key
factor to affix at least two of these potential actors firmly to the integrated
development strategy, much in the same manner as Bismarck envisioned it over a
century ago. Professional LA bureaucracies have been a primary actor in the region along
over a century, especially during developmentalism as has been highlighted.
They conform by far the largest, better structured, and stably employed, group
in any country. Especially, the branch that is most powerful, autonomous, and
strategically aware: the military. They are now are important sponsors of LA
integration. Even the commander in chief of the Chilean army has recently
declared that not only should Chile join Mercosur as a full member, but also
this association should advance rapidly from economic to political union[17].
This example has an especial significance, coming from the army of a country
that under Pinochet notoriously withdrew from integration efforts.[18] LA foreign services have also been a systematically consistent key
driving force behind the integration process, since at least a couple of
decades. Itamarati has assumed the
leading role during years and throughout governments of otherwise quite
diverging political stances (Pinheiro Guimarães, 2007).[19]
The EU has been a driving force regarding LA integration, in several
ways. Probably, following their own strategic considerations that could reflect
the aspect of rivalry in their long-term relation with the US. Quite evidently,
the influence of the EU vis-a-vis the US in LA only seems to gain out of the
integration of the latter. Especially if the alternative is individual
countries subordinated to their northern neighbour or, even worst, collective
subordinated in the framework of FTAA. However, a more pressing factor behind this interest is the quite
extraordinary surge of Spanish direct investment in LA. EU countries other than
Spain have also increased theirs, but much less significantly. Spanish capital
has displaced all other direct foreign investors in LA, including the US, in
just a few years. A virtual armada of modern Spanish conquerors landed in LA in
the 1990s. Large Spanish conglomerates spearheaded it, private, recently
privatized, and even public ones. Amazingly fast, they acquired a dominant role
throughout the whole region in banking, energy, and telecommunications, as well
as public services under private concession, such as water and infrastructure.
They have attained significant stakes in several other relevant industries as
well. This was stimulated by the simultaneous occurrence of a first-ever outpour
of Spanish foreign direct investment (FDI) in general, on the one side, and the
privatization and market openings in LA, on the other. Both situations seem to
be rooted as well in the late-coming but swift socio-economic change that has
been taking place in one as well as the other.[20] It seems only natural that swelling
Spanish FDI would look towards LA. The long-term impact of this business invasion on LA integration process
may have been under-estimated, and is certainly quite under-researched. In the
future, it will probably be considered as a key detonator of the process. Much
in the same way as British capital was a relevant factor in the US “conquest of
the west,” during the second part of the 19-century. Just as their ancestors had during the conquest of America, the new Spanish
conquerors view the region as a whole as they move swiftly across it. It has
always been mind-blowing how descubridores
and conquistadores covered the entire
span of what today is LA in just a few years – quite on foot most of the time[21].
To be fair, LA retained a remarkable unity under Spanish dominance. The
same may be said of the independence movement, which took place quite
simultaneously throughout the region. In an impressive demonstration of
continental vision and reach, Bolivar and San Martin led the victorious march
of their liberation armies from what today are Venezuela and Argentina,
respectively, to their final embrace in Ayacucho, exactly in the heart of South
America. However, in the wake of independence, LA republics behaved in a way that
was no different to the early indigenous inhabitants. After evidencing an
incredible drive to cover the whole continent, the communities they established
turned into almost complete isolation, which lasted centuries in one case, and
millennia in the other. This isolation is evident in different intonations of
the present Iberic languages, and also in the quite different structures of the
Native American dialects. The new conquistadores have behaved
like later day Pizarros. The triumphant LA forays of Banco Santander and BBVA,
Endesa and Repsol, or Telefonica, during the 1990s are well known. However, these
large Spanish fragatas were followed,
and sometimes preceded, by a swarm of young, enthusiastic, small and medium
entrepreneurs. [22] Evidently, foreign direct investors view the region as a whole, and
operate accordingly, usually from headquarters located in one of the main LA
capitals. They follow a comprehensive LA business plan, and use standardized
procedures, centralized services, procurement, outsourcing, and publicity, for
the whole region. On the other hand, in order to be successful, they are forced
to quickly master the subtleties of each country. They share all this
experience with the highly qualified professional cadres that manage their
operations, jumping from one capital to the other just as any EU or US
executive does within their respective territories. Spaniards have the great advantage of the common peninsular language and
cultural origins, so they move in LA quite like fish in the water. However,
most of these cadres are in fact native LA. In this way, Spanish capital is
becoming an extraordinarily effective business school for those that, quite
probably in the end, will end up jumping ahead of them as the main economic
unifying force of regional integration: LA business. “Se pasan de giles
(they behave like fools),” declared Horst Paulman, owner of the giant Chilean-Argentinean
Jumbo retail chain, in reference to businesspersons
of the former who do not invest in the latter. He knows what he is talking
bout, as his company now controls a significant part of the market in both
countries. He has profited hugely from investing in one profits reaped in the
other, taking advantage of frequently alternating economic and foreign exchange
cycles in both countries during recent decades. Mostly since 1990, Chilean big business has started pouring out foreign
direct investment (FDI) for the first time ever. Large Chilean companies have
directly invested around 40 billion US$ dollar abroad, about a third of 2006
Chilean GDP. Most of it has gone into energy, forestry, and retail, but in
several other industries as well. Over half (52%) of the accumulated total is
concentrated in Argentine, indicating they are not “giles,” and most of the rest
is distributed in Brazil (16%), Peru (16%) and Bolivia (8%). Practically all
the remaining FDI is also in other LA countries (CENDA, 2004).
Large local entrepreneurs in the most advanced LA countries may tell a
similar story. Perhaps the most notorious example is Mexican billionaire Carlos
Slim, at the same time the richest person the region and the world, according
to the 2007 Fortune estimate. The son
of a modest Lebanese immigrant, Slim has built an empire around beer, and privatized
cement and telephone monopolies - he owns Corona, CEMEX, and Telmex, among many
other industry leaders -, which now includes banks, and media. Even though he
does not refrain to enter the US market, where he has made notorious
acquisitions, at the same time he is highly critical of NAFTA. He invests
heavily in LA, especially in South America, from Venezuela all the way down to
Chile. In 2003, Slim conveyed in his sprawling mansion in Veracruz what was
probably the first summit of emergent LA large private conglomerates. All the
family heads of LA largest private conglomerates attended the meeting, together
with their heirs in waiting. It is not known what they talked about during
their weeklong strait, but it is not probable that planning of regional joint
ventures were to be completely overshadowed by more pleasurable activities in
which these guys are know to indulge. Traditionally a very important parts of LA bureaucracy, its
intellectuals – which were mostly harboured in universities and other public
academic institutions - have always played a hugely progressive role in LA
strategic development. The climatic moment of developmentalism may perhaps de
dated in November 29, 1971, when President Fidel Castro – at the moment the guest
of President Salvador Allende – visited the new, beautiful, and imposing circular
central auditorium of ECLAC in Santiago, to address one of the most illustrious
gatherings of LA intellectuals ever, chaired by non other than Dr. Raul
Prebisch himself. Fidel delivered a formidable speech, showing how revolutionary Cuba had
implemented ECLAC’s program in nutrition, health, education, industrialization,
energy, etc. He concluded with a vibrant allegation in favour of LA
integration. After mentioning the giants of the moment, USA, the Soviet Union,
and the EU, and emphasizing how the latter had managed to unite the territory
of “ferocious wars, which during the last five centuries have been killing each
other systematically, and where each speaks his own very different language.” He
called to overcome “balkanization, the weakened position of peoples that have
so much in common as our LA peoples, which will have no chance to survive in
the future but the closest economic union and, consequently, also in the future
the closest political union, to conform a new community that in 30 years time
would reach 600 million inhabitants (APPLAUSE). However, even in that condition
we would need to make huge efforts to occupy a place in the world of tomorrow.”
After each assertion, he paused and searched approval from Raul
Prebisch, seated beside him. “Isn’t it true, Dr. Prebisch? Yes, Mr. President -
once and again answered the founder of ECLAC and main inspirational force
behind LA developmentalism -– it is true” (Castro, 1971). That
20-century LA’s most formidable political figure came to render exam to its
most illustrious intellectual, in the site of perhaps its highest academic
institutional creation, is a symbol of the importance of the latter in defining
the region’s autonomous strategy during the developmentalist period. However, it must be reckoned that this is not happening today, at least concerning
LA integration. Even ECLAC hardly studies integration any more, and certainly
is not behind it as a driving force, as it was until three, or even two decades
ago. The little-analyzed privatization of LA intellectuals during recent
decades, as well as the systematic cooptation of public universities and other
academic institutions by Neoliberal way of thinking, has probably played not a
small part in this decline. The US strategy to block or delay LA integration and subordinate
individual countries to their hegemony not only follows grand schemes such as
NAFTA, FTAA or FTA. It must be noted that not a minor part of US strategy in
this aspect has consisted in co-opting LA intellectuals, mainly its economists,
to an abstract and non-strategic view of this problem, such as promoted by
Neoliberalism, for which these considerations simply do not exist, as opening
up markets is always beneficial, in the long run. They have played a subtle and
intelligent game of networking these cadres, and promoting them through a long
chain of institutions, in the top of which sits the BWI, but where “independent”
central banks and semi-autonomous finance ministries play a key role at the
country level. Universities also play an important role in this kind of
networking, as well as other international organizations. The BWI institutions – and the complex network they have built and lead
-, may certainly take a lot of credit for this shift, as well as other US
agencies, such as the ones that sponsored the seminal agreement between the
University of Chicago and the Catholic University of Chile (Pontificia Universidad Católica, PUC),
in 1955, which produced the “Chicago Boys.” Since the 1980s, PUC has implemented a one and two year
course[23],
where governmental cadres of all over LA come to study the elementary concepts
of the Neoliberal model, financed by their respective governments, which
maintain their salaries, and by IDB and other BWI grants. The even less studied role of donor agencies – including prominent
European donors - that assumed a significant role in financing intellectual
activity in LA during the 1980s and 1990, and shaping their agenda in the
process, has played a significant role as well in this shift. Certainly, however, the main cause of the decline of LA intellectuals,
as a driving force behind LA integration and other strategic aspects of development,
should be searched within LA societies.
Intellectuals usually belong to the middle classes, which were in good
part co-opted as such in support of the Washington consensus model, especially
the more moderate “third-way” versions. Some States abandoned in part their
deliberate efforts to maintain important concentrations of academics in
universities and other centres, which was the base of the distinguished
traditional intellectual drive behind LA developmentalism. This was another
negative consequence of the unilateral and in some cases extreme course
followed by the second State strategy adopted during past decades, especially,
when this took place under right wing dictatorships. The regrouping of LA
intellectuals, mainly within the realm of a reconstructed and reinforced modern
LA public university system – process that probably needs seminal efforts
similar in a way to the PUC-University of Chicago 1955 agreement - seems quite
an imperative today. However,
there has been a significant private reaction of progressive intellectuals to
the partial dismantling of public academic centres, or their co-option by
Neoliberal way of thinking. Hundreds of private intellectual centres sprung
throughout LA, which assumed a critical stance regarding mainstream policies.
Many times they grew under the protection of the social movement, both the
traditional workers movement but also new expressions of civil society such as
women, environmentalists, landless peasants, indigenous peoples and many others.
The human rights movement, which surged in response to the right wing
dictatorships, played a significant role and many times were protected by the
Catholic Church and other religious institutions. International donors supported
this network, although some times this meant introducing certain biases in their
agenda. As a result of these movements, there are several networks of NGOs that
span the whole LA region, which have played an important role in critiquing the
Neoliberal and US-led strategies regarding regional integration, and promoting
alternatives[24]. The
anti-FTAA movement has been on of its main expressions, and the LA version of
the World Social Forum its most important overall organisation. Finally, even
though this is not the appropriate place to treat the matter in extenso, a mention must be made to
artists as one of the relevant forces behind this process. This is quite clear
to anyone who listens to the beautiful “Canción
para todos,” true hymn of LA integration, which is usual to be sung by
artists and public in small and large musical events throughout the continent (Isella & Tejada Gómez, Junio 1996). No integration process whatsoever will be possible if it is not able to
seduce the region’s emerging social force that is overwhelmingly massive: the
new urban salaried middle sectors. In the present social scenery of LA as a
whole, and especially in the countries that are in the more advanced phases of
transition, any progressive strategy, and certainly regional integration, must
include this emerging force as a basic part of the power block required to
promote it to success. In this sense, the situation of LA today is not entirely different to
the one confronted during the second part of the 19-century by Western European
regions that were relative late comers to the process of national unification.
As then, the leading States were already in place and thriving, and in order to
catch up, it seemed necessary to build some sovereign spaces of a similar order
of magnitude. On the other hand, the underlying socio-economic conditions
within the latecomer regions had matured up to a point where it seemed possible
to be successful in the intent. Especially, a massive modern salariat had emerged, which then as
today is fundamental premise of such a possibility. How to seduce it into supporting a political block that may realize this
strategy? The Iron Chancellor found the way to do it. Perhaps, the driving
agents behind today’s process in LA should give him a second reading. The
emerging progressive LA coalitions already have made an explicit revival in
their political programs of the other towering figure behind the building of
progressive modern coalitions in this continent: he who offered a New Deal to
the masses of American salaried workers in the wake of the Great depression,
and got advice from Lord Keynes. In this way, it is possible that under the
unlikely pair of portraits of Roosevelt and Bismarck hanging in the background,
LA integration may move ahead towards integration under the auspices of a New
Deal where regional social policy becomes the basic binding material for this
building. It has been noted above that the emerging development and integration
strategies presently follows two quite distinctive and complementary paths. Both
follow the same “cambiar el modelo Neoliberal” slogan, but are quite different
in nature. It has also been noted that their socio-economic background is
strikingly dissimilar, and that it is basically the presence or relative absence
of one actor in one or the other that makes all the difference: peasants, or
rather peasants and recently immigrated urban poor, to be more precise. The
integration of LA must consider this most important actor if it is to succeed.
It still represents almost half of the overall population when recently
immigrant urban poor are taken into account into this category. If it is
relatively easy to incite separatist, nationalistic, and xenophobic,
self-destructive, sentiments even among urban salaried workers, this is much
easier in the case of peasants – the same happens with urban petit bourgeoisie
-, as is well known. Tragic historical experiences well prove this point. It seems that the pressing need of building huge cross border
developmentalist projects, and the sheer need to build a modern market of 21-century
dimensions, could perhaps be enough to incite business into allowing frontiers
to be opened to regional trade, investment, and labour mobility. Maybe, the
strategic minded general staffs of LA bureaucracies are already somewhat
convinced about the need to partially cede their now rather ineffective
national level sovereignty in the benefit of sharing a more effective regional
stature. However, it is difficult that salaried workers may be enthusiastic
about such a move if it is not associated with potent signals regarding their
rights, and smaller scale[25] but more concrete measures of regional
social policy in their direct benefit. Furthermore, in the case of vast masses of LA peasants and urban poor,
concrete regional social policy measures seem indispensable to motivate their support
for integration. Minimum regional livelihood guarantees could be set, for
example, that are quite feasible from an economic or financial point of view.
Lula’s political success in Brazil seems to prove this overall point. This huge
country is like a slightly reduced version of LA, and contains within itself
almost everything that is present in the larger region – and in similar
proportions, although its history of slavery is peculiar. It has been noted
that Lula’s direct cash transfers to the poor have been a relevant element in
his political successful first term in office, and that those policies are indeed
quite cheap. In the larger region, it seems possible to argue that similar
policies associated to a regional integration process may well include peasants
and urban poor into the emerging political power blocs that are needed to
promote the new LA developmentalist welfare that may be in the making. BibliographyAnderson, P. (1974). Lineages of the Absolutist State. London, UK: Verso. Blackburn, R. (1997). The Making of New World Slavery. London, UK: Verso. Castro, F. (1971, noviembre 29). DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIMER SECRETARIO DEL COMITE CENTRAL DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA Y PRIMER MINISTRO DEL GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO, EN LA SEDE DE LA COMISION ECONOMICA PARA LA AMERICA LATINA, EN SANTIAGO DE CHILE, EL 29 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1971. Retrieved abril 10, 2008 from Cuba.cu: http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1971/esp/d291171e.html CELADE. (1998). América Latina: proyecciones de población, 1970-2050". CEPAL/CELADE (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe/Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía). Santiago: CEPAL. CELADE. (1996). Impacto de las tendencias demográficas sobre los sectores sociales en América Latina; contribución al diseño de políticas y programas. Serie E (45). CELADE/BID (Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía/Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo). Santiago de Chile: CELADE. CENDA. (2007). Chile: Resultados de las Estrategias del Estado a lo Largo de un Siglo. Retrieved November 26, 2008 from CENDA: www.cendachile.cl CENDA. (2004). ‘Propuesta para una Nueva Política de Integración Regional’. Retrieved November 17, 2004 from Centro de Estudios Nacionales de Desarrollo Alternativo: http://cep.cl/CENDA/Proyectos/Minsegpres/Propuesta_Integracion.doc. Dornbusch, R. a. (1991). The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America’. National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report. . Cambridge, MA: NBER. Draibe, S., & Riesco, M. (2007). Chapter 1. In M. Riesco (Ed.), Latin America, A New Developmental Welfare State in the Making? London, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan. Draibe, S., & Riesco, M. (2007). Introduction. In M. Riesco (Ed.), Latin America, A New Developmental Welfare State in the Making? . London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. ECLAC. (2002). Statistical Yearbook. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Santiago: ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). Ermida Uriarte, O. (2007). The Social Dimension of Mercosur. International Labour Organization, ILO. ILO. Fazio, H. (2000). La Transnacionalización de la Economía Chilena: Mapa de la Extrema Riqueza al Año 2000. Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones. Ffrench-Davis, R., & Devlin, R. (1998). Towards an Evaluation of Regional Integration in Latin America in the 1990s. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, BID, Instituto para la integración de Al y el Caribe, INTAL. BID. Goldman-Sachs. (2003). ‘Dreaming With BRICs. The Path to 2050’. Global Economics Paper, 99. . Goldman-Sachs, Economic Research from the GS Financial Workbench. . Goldman-Sachs. Hobsbawm, E. (1995). The Age of Extremes. Maine, US: Abacus. Illanes, M. A., & Riesco, M. (2007). Chapter 9. In M. Riesco (Ed.), Latin America, A New Developmental Welfare State Model in the Making? (pp. 378-424). London, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan. INP. (2004). Chile: Proyección Previsional de la Población Afiliada y Cotizante a las AFP. Instituto de Normalización Previsional, Estudios. Santiago: http://cep.cl/Cenda/Proyectos/INP/INP.htm accessed march 2008. INTAL. (2008). Intrumentos Básicos de Integración, Cronología. Retrieved March 26, 2008 from Banco Interamericano de desarrollo, BID, Instituto para la Integración de América Latina y el Caribe.: http://www.iadb.org/intal/cronologia.asp?idioma=esp&cid=237&aid=1311 Isella, C., & Tejada Gómez, A. (Junio 1996). Canción con todos. (C. Isella, M. Sosa, Aute, L. Gieco, Piero, & otros, Performers) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gjNdfopY00k, Quito, Ecuador. Jocelyn-Holt, A. (1999). La Independencia de Chile. Santiago: Planeta. Kwon, H.-j. (2005). 'An Overview of the Study: The Developmental Welfare State and Policy Reforms in East Asia'. In H.-j. Kwon (Ed.), Transforming the Developmental Welfare State in East Asia (pp. 1-23). London, UK: Palgrave-McMillan. Lipschutz, A. (1955). ‘El Problema Racial en la Conquista de América y el Mestizaje’ in Cademártori, J. (1972) La Economía Chilena. Santiago: Cormorán. Mercosur. (2008). Sistema de información Mercosur. Retrieved April 3, 2008 from Portal oficial del Mercosur: http://www.mercosur.int/ MINEDUCC. (2007). Educación y Mercosur (8). Ministerio de educación del Uruguay. (2007). Educación y Mercosur. Educación y Mercosur (8). Pinheiro Guimarães, S. (2007). El mundo multipolar y la integración sudamericana. Retrieved March 14, 2008 from Centro de Estudios Nacionales de Desarrollo Alternaivo, CENDA, Santiago-Chile: www.cendachile.cl/pinheiro_integracion Riesco, M. (2007). Derrumbe de un Mito. Chile reforma sus sistemas provatizados de educación y previsión. Santiago, Chile: CENDA. Suleiman, E. (2004). The Dismantling of Democratic States. Princeton, USA: Princeton Universtity Press. Therborn, G. (1995). European Modernity and Beyond. The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945-2000. London, UK: Sage. UNDP. (2002). Human Development Report. United Nations Development Program. UNDP. UNDP. (2002). Social Protection in an Insecure Area: A South-South Exchange on Alternative Social Policies Responses to Globalization’. Final Report. Inter-Regional Workshop, Santiago, Chile, May 14-17, 2002. . Santiago, Chile: http://videos.cep.cl/sw2002/Informe_Final/SW2002_Final_Report.html. Accessed on 17 November 2004. . UNRISD. (2003a). Late Industrializers and the development of the Welfare State. Geneve, Switzerland: UNRISD. UNRISD. (2007). Latin America, A New Developmental Welfare State Model in the Making? (M. Riesco, Ed.) London, UK: Palgrave - Macmillan. UNRISD. (2005). The 'Pay Your Taxes' Debate! Geneve: http://www.corporate- accountability.org/docs/UNRISD_taxes-Chile_Riesco.pdf. Accessed September 2005. . Williamson, J. (2002). Did the Washington Consensus Fail? . Washington D.C., US: Institute for International Economics’. Outline of remarks at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Nov 6, 2002. http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson1102.htm . World Bank. (2004). Urban Population in World Bank Regions by City Size. Retrieved july 28, 2006 from World Bank: January, http://www.worldbank.org/urban/env/population-regions.htm World Bank. (2002, April). World Development Indicators database, World Bank,. Retrieved April 2004 from World Bank: www.worldbank.org AcronymsAFP: Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (Private Pension Fund Administrators) ALADI: Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (Latin American Association of Integration) ALALC: Asociación Lationoamericana de Libre Comercio (Latin American Association of Free Trade) ALBA: Acuerdo para la aplicación de la alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra América y el Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos, ALBA ALIDES: Alianza para el Desarrollo Sostenible de Centroamérica (Alliance for the Sustainable Development of Central America) BBVA: Banco Bilbao Viscaya Argentaria (Spain) BWI: Bretton Woods Institutions CAN: Comunidad Andina de Naciones (Andean Community of Nations) CARICOM: Caribbean Common Market CCR: Comite de Coordinación Regional of Educational Ministers of Mercosur CELADE: Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía, dependency of ECLAC (Latin American Demography Centre) ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean EU: European Union FDI: Foreign Direct Investments FTA: Free Trade Agreements FTAA: Free Trade Agreement of the Americas GANEMPLE: (Grupo alto nivel estrategia Mercosur de creimiento del empleo GB: Great Britain GDA: Grupo de Diarios America GDP: Gross Domestic Product GISM: Grupo del Instituto Social del Mercosur GTASM: Grupo de trabajo ad hoc para superación de Asimetrías en el Mercosur IDB: Inter American Development Bank INE: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (National Statistics and Census Bureau, Chile) INTAL: Instituto para la Integración de America Latina (Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean), dependency of IDB. LA: Latin America, latinamerican MERCOSUR: Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market) NGO: Non Guvernmental Organisations PPP: Purchasing Power Parity PT: Partido dos Trabalhadores, Workers’s Party, Brazil PUC: Pontificia Universidad Católica (Chile) UNASUR: Unión de Naciones del Sur (Union of the Nations in the South) UNILA: Universidade Federal da Integração Latino-Americana (Federal University of Latinamerican Integration) UNRISD: United Nations research Institute for Social Development, Geneve WB: World Bank AppendixTable 2: Latin American and the Caribbean Countries According to Groups of Demographic Transition, elaborated by CELADE
Source: CELADE, 1992; (CELADE, 1996), presented in Riesco (ed) Latin America A New Developmental Welfare State Model in the Making? 2007. UNRISD, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Table 3: Population and GDP in LA and the Caribbean, according to demographic transition groups
Source: (CELADE, 1996), (UNDP, 2002), (World Bank, 2002), (CELADE, 1998), (ECLAC, 2002), Appendix Tables 1-2, 3, 4. NA Not available. Riesco (ed) Latin America A New Developmental Welfare State Model in the Making? 2007. UNRISD, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Table 4: Urbanization and Salaried Workers in LA and the Caribbean, according to demographic transition groups
Source: (CELADE, 1996), (UNDP, 2002), (World Bank, 2002), (CELADE, 1998), (ECLAC, 2002), Appendix Tables 1-2, 3, 4. NA Not available. Riesco (ed) Latin America A New Developmental Welfare State Model in the Making? 2007. UNRISD, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Table 5: Public social Expenditure in LA and the Caribbean, according to demographic transition groups
Source: (CELADE, 1996), (UNDP, 2002), (World Bank, 2002), (CELADE, 1998), (ECLAC, 2002), Appendix Tables 1-2, 3, 4. NA Not available. Riesco (ed) Latin America A New Developmental Welfare State Model in the Making? 2007. UNRISD, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Table 6: Human Development and Income Distribution in LA and the Caribbean, according to demographic transition groups
Source: (CELADE, 1996), (UNDP, 2002), (World Bank, 2002), (CELADE, 1998), (ECLAC, 2002), Appendix Tables 1-2, 3, 4. NA Not available. Riesco (ed) Latin America A New Developmental Welfare State Model in the Making? 2007. UNRISD, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Table 7: Latin American integration initiatives, 1958-2008 – Intra.region Schemes
Source: (INTAL, 2008)
Table 8: Latin American integration initiatives, 1958-2008 – Inter-regional Schemes
Source: (INTAL, 2008)
[1][1] This chapter summarizes some of the findings of the book Latin America, A New Developmental Welfare State Model in the Making?, ed. Manuel Riesco (London: Palgrave - Macmillan, 2007). The book is part of the UNRISD research project Social Policy in a Development Context. All data throughout this text, not specifically referenced, has this source . [2] Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía, part of the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). [3] Religious feast days. [4] Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones [5] Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. [6] Jacques Chonchol, Allende’s minister of agriculture and father of the Chilean agrarian reform – a brilliant, serene, and prudent person – argued that in order to minimize disruption it should be rapid, drastic and massive. [7] The much celebrated by some, “Washington Consensus,” emerged form a meeting in this city that took place in 1992 (Williamson 2002). [8] A fairly universal public non-contributive pension was introduced in mid 2008, which will eventually cover 60% of the workforce that was not receiving any effective coverage from the privatised AFP system. In addition, the over 90% of Chileans want their pensions to be State run, and over 72% want education and health as well, according to a mid 2008 Latinbarometro, a regular regional poll commissioned by Grupo de Diarios America, GDA, a group of the largest mainstream LA media of which the Chilean El Mercurio is part, of active Chilean workers would want to go back to the old pay-as-you-go public pension system if permitted to do so. The latter system still pays pensions to three out of every four elders in Chile, and the amount received by its beneficiaries easily doubles the corresponding pensions that are beginning to be paid by the AFP; this difference is even larger in the case of women. This was the case even before the present crisis wiped out a significant part of the pension fund – up to October 2008 most affiliates had lost between one third and half of their savings. [9] On the other hand, one million secondary students took to the streets in 2006 demanding the derogation of the privatizing laws inherited from Pinochet, which the democratic governments has not dared or wanted to change so far. Polls reveal that an overwhelming majority favour returning all schools to the public system Riesco, M. (2007). Derrumbe de un Mito. Chile reforma sus sistemas provatizados de educación y previsión. Santiago, Chile: CENDA.Presently about half of the students attend private education in schools heavily subsidised by the government, and universities; meanwhile the remains of the public establishments are scattered in local governments that struggle with reduced budgets. The overall system lacks supervision, which was entrusted to “the market.” As a result, overall quality has decreased severely, the out of pocket expenses for the families have reached half the total cost, and a wide segmentation has appeared. Furthermore, although democratic governments have tried to recover public expenditure from the depressed levels inherited from the dictatorship, in relation to GDP it is still half the level attained before the 1973 coup. Furthermore, as the proportion of students to total population is lower today than it was before the coup, considering public and private establishments in all educational levels. At the same time the proportion of young population has decreased, so coverage has increased, however, Chile has fallen behind in tertiary level, where coverage is still around 40%, less than neighbouring Argentina and Uruguay, and very far from the 98% coverage attained by South Korea, in this level Riesco, M. (2007). Derrumbe de un Mito. Chile reforma sus sistemas provatizados de educación y previsión. Santiago, Chile: CENDA. [10] Venezuela and Bolivia, for example, have successfully renegotiated with powerful foreign companies over a more fair redistribution of windfall oil and gas revenues. Even the previous government of Ecuador joined them in these measures, which have restored billions of dollars in annual revenues to their rightful owners, the citizens of the countries that host these rich mineral resources and are entitled to the significant ground rent they generate. By contrast, Neoliberal leaning Chilean governments have not been able to deal effectively with a small group of mostly London-listed conglomerates, which presently exploit over 70% of the country’s rich copper mines – the remaining production, as well as over half of reserves, are still in hands of CODELCO, the giant State copper company inherited from the developmentalist period. All mineral resources were nationalized by Allende and are declared “inalienable” even by the 1980 Pinochet constitution, still in effect. However, a legislative twist introduced by Pinochet and sustained by the democratic governments has permitted private companies to take hold of these resources and exploit them under long term leases, without paying any royalties or even regular income taxes, at all, for over a decade. Last year they reaped profits for around 20 billion dollars, roughly the equivalent of the total annual budget of the Chilean State, and paid less than 4 billion in taxes. A small royalty charge was introduced in 2004, after wide public dissatisfaction with this situation. However, the new scheme in practice reduced the effective tax rate of the copper companies that had cheated the most with their income returns during the previous decade UNRISD. (2005). The 'Pay Your Taxes' Debate! Geneve: http://www.corporate- accountability.org/docs/UNRISD_taxes-Chile_Riesco.pdf. Accessed September 2005. . [11] According to the now classic 2001 calculations of investment bank Goldman-Sachs, for example, BRIC countries, which stands for Brazil, Russia, India, and China, now represent 15% of GDP of G6 economies, will represent half of the latter group in 2025, and will surpass them by 2040, in dollar terms (Goldman-Sachs 2003). [12] Purchasing power parity adjusted (ppp) [13] Wikipedia describes it quite correctly in the following way: “The Union of South American Nations (Spanish: Unión de Naciones Suramericanas and Portuguese: União das Nações Sul-Americanas, abbreviated as Unasur and Unasul) is a fledgling supranational and intergovernmental union that will unite two existing free-trade organizations – Mercosur and the Andean Community – as part of a continuing process of South American integration. It is loosely modeled on the European Union. According to agreements made thus far, the Union's headquarters will be located in Quito, the capital of Ecuador, while its bank, the South American Bank, will be located in Brasilia, Brazil. The Union's former designation, the South American Community of Nations (Spanish: Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones and Portuguese: Comunidade Sul-Americana de Nações, abbreviated as CSN; Dutch: Zuid-Amerikaanse Statengemeenschap) was dropped at the First South American Energy Summit on April 16, 2007. Complete integration of the Andean Community and Mercosur to create Unasur/Unasul is expected by the end of 2007.” [14] Another chapter of the book presents a detailed history of integration advances and retrenchments. [15] Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). [16] The US Congress has lengthily documented the activity of CIA and other covert US agencies regarding LA press. For example, the results of the special commission of US parliament that investigated secret US involvement in the Chilean 1973 coup – know as the Church report, by the MP who headed this commission – denounces how the CIA had paid reporters working in the international section of the main newspapers in LA, with the explicit mission was to publish regular news and commentaries contrary to Allende. [17] General Juan Emilio Cheyre expressed this view at length in an interview with several leftist political leaders in the course of the 2005 presidential and parliamentary campaign. The author was present at this interview. [18] The Chilean military also play an active role in improving the relations of the country with its neighbours, through what is called the 2+2 diplomacy that has been implemented since a few years ago, which officially involves both a diplomat and a military in most key meetings among LA countries, especially the neighbouring ones. The role of the military regarding integration efforts was confirmed by a front-page picture that appeared in April 2007 in the Chilean and Bolivian press, showing the Commander in Chief of the Chilean navy together with his Bolivian counterpart, at the helm of Inca piragua in Lake Titicaca! Chile and Bolivia, of course, have had no formal ambassador level diplomatic relations for decades, and tensions have been especially high recently. [19] Moreover, they have made sure that they are not alone in this quest. Most of the region’s professional diplomats have studied in Brasilia’s highly regarded foreign policy academies at some point ion their careers, and all LA representations around the world officially constitute and operate as GRULAC or Grupo Latinamericano. They become friendly, and it is not infrequent to watch them exchanging sardonic glances from opposite sides of negotiating tables, when their usually less experienced Foreign Ministers and other politically designated dignitaries say something they considered inappropriate, especially regarding LA integration. [20] Spain is in many ways an emergent economy itself, which appears to have a lead of perhaps no more than one or two decades at most in relation to the more advanced regions of LA. Young emergent capitalist countries have a long, complex, rich, creative and terribly disruptive, history of similar expansions. [21] Peoples crossing from Asia across the Bering Strait achieved the same feat much earlier, of course, but it took them thousand of years to reach the southern tip of the continent. The third wave of immigration into America, which was by far the most massive, took place by the turn of the 20-century, but was confined to specific regions, mainly around Rio de la Plata and north of Rio Grande. [22] They landed in LA during the 1990s, sometimes enticed by EU-sponsored joint venture programs for PYME. Drawing fewer headlines, but exhibiting a sense of adventure and courage not unlike the heroism of old descubridores, they criss-crossed the region doing business all along, in a flash getting to know it much better than any native. Some were successful, others not so much. No few ended up in the same way as old Cabeza de Vaca, the amazing Spaniard who literally walked from the Rio de la Plata to the Missisippi, whose bones lie somewhere in still unexplored depths of America. [23] The Curso intensivo de Evaluación Económica de Proyectos Públicos , CIAPEPP, Facultad de Economía, Universidad Católica de Chile. [24] The author led a research requested by the Ford Foundation in 2008, which identified the main ONG networks throughout LA that are dedicated significantly to LA integration. The list is quite impressive. [25] The dimension of regional programs is rather small. For example, after 50 years, the overall budget of the EU, including social tranfers, amounts to about 1% of regional GDP. In the case of les developed and smaller projects such as Mercosur, the budget of the regional institutions and programs is presently in the order of 0,0025% of regional GDP. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||


